Publications

“Berkeley’s Theory of Vision: A New Look”

Journal of the History of Philosophy, forthcoming, penultimate version here.

Abstract: I defend a new interpretation of Berkeley’s theory of vision designed to solve a pair of interrelated interpretive problems: the first has to do with visual perception of three- dimensionality and the second with the psychological flexibility of the visual process. Though the first problem has been discussed extensively, previous solutions are unsatisfying for reasons to be explained; the second problem has not been discussed before. My interpretation breaks new ground and locates the resources to solve both problems by contextualizing Berkeley’s theory of vision among underexplored aspects of his metaphysics and his views of human psychology.

Works Under Review

Paper on perceptual representation and the neuroscience of selective attention [title redacted for review]

(Email me here to see drafts of papers under review).

Working Drafts & Unpublished Manuscripts

“Berkeley’s Hybrid View of Appearances”

Download working draft here.

Abstract: This paper argues for a new interpretation of Berkeley’s view of perceptual appearances. I show that Berkeley is not a direct theorist of perception as is often supposed, and that he does not identify what appears to us in sensory perception with the real physical world. At the same time, he is not a representationalist about appearances, either. Instead, Berkeley thinks perceptual appearances are seamless amalgams of representational and non-representational components. I defend this view through careful examination of Berkeley’s texts and by contextualizing his thought in the history of perceptual psychology. A perhaps-surprising upshot is that Berkeley lays the conceptual foundations for some of today’s most popular theories of perceptual processing over 150 years before Hermann von Helmholtz pens his classic works on sensory physiology, works that have until now garnered for Helmholtz credit that Bishop Berkeley deserves.

Note: this is a working draft that will be taken down soon when I send it out for publication. This is one of two papers into which I have split “Berkeley’s Doctrine of Twofold Existence”, linked below. Whereas the latter paper took a more analytic approach, this paper and its counterpart (not listed here) tell roughly the same story in a more detailed contextualist fashion.

“Berkeley’s Doctrine of Twofold Existence”

Download unpublished manuscript here.

Abstract: In this paper I defend a new interpretation of Berkeley’s idealism. Berkeley criticizes his opponents for their commitment to the “twofold existence of the objects of sense, the one... in the mind, the other... without the mind” (PHK 86). He believes this doctrine requires implausible departures from common sense and invites skeptical doubts. According to a familiar story, Berkeley avoids these problems by embracing a brand of idealism that collapses his opponents’ “twofold existence” into a single level of existence where the ideas in our minds are identical with physical reality. In this paper I show this familiar story to be mistaken: rather than effecting any such collapse, Berkeley’s idealism commits him to a novel and philosophically interesting doctrine of the twofold existence of the objects of sense that is not plagued by any of the same problems as his opponents’ version, and yet still implies a meaningful distinction between physical objects as they are in themselves and physical objects as we experience them.

Note: This is a précis of my dissertation. After it received multiple split decisions (conditional accept/reject) and was runner-up for the 2024 Sanders Prize in Early Modern I chose to retire it and (as noted above) I am now breaking it into two papers that present (mostly) the same material in a more detailed and contextually sensitive manner. Since both of those papers are not yet available, I keep this version posted for now.

“Al-Haytham’s Medieval Sensory Core Theory”

Download working draft here.

Abstract: This paper argues, contra Hatfield and Epstein, that al-Haytham was a sensory core theorist: he took visual processing to involve a conscious correlate of two-dimensional optical stimulation—i.e., a conscious sensation of a 2D array of light and color—and to proceed by rapid, unconscious inferences based on the contents of this array. The paper is also intended to offer a general and accessible introduction to al-Haytham’s theory of vision.

Note: This is an older piece of work, written early in grad school (circa 2020). Don’t judge me too harshly for the quality. I hope to return to it and develop it into a proper monograph on al-Haytham one day. To fully develop this project, I hope to collaborate with a scholar of classical Arabic, however, I have not yet been able to find anyone interested. Please email me if you are interested in talking about al-Haytham (whether or not you read Arabic).

You can view my dissertation here.